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WHEN SELF-POLICING DOES NOT WORK: A
PROPOSAL FOR POLICING PROSECUTORS IN
THEIR OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENSE
Sara Gurwitch*
It is incumbent upon all those who study the criminal
justice system to evaluate the causes of wrongful convictions,
and to consider ways to address them.' While certain
causes-including faulty eyewitness identifications and
unreliable confessions-have, appropriately, received
significant attention2  and useful reforms have been
proposed,3 the role of prosecutorial misconduct in wrongful
conviction cases has failed to generate reform efforts within
the criminal justice community.
Under Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors have a
constitutional obligation to provide the defense with
exculpatory material.4 If a prosecutor fails in this obligation,
*Supervising Attorney, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York; Adjunct
Clinical Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; J.D., University of
Minnesota Law School, 1995; B.A., Barnard College, Columbia University,
1987. I would like to thank Alexis Agathocleous, Horacio Devoto, Eric Janus,
Claire Kelly, Namita Luthra, Michael Pinard, and David Weissbrodt for their
very useful insights.
1. The fact of wrongful convictions is well documented. See, e.g., JIM
DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000).
2. See Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler,
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 338 (1997);
Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal
Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 283, 289-92 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
237, 261-66 (discussing videotaping interrogations as a method to address false
confessions); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 615, 642 (discussing lineup reform procedures); Richard A. Wise et
al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
807, 854 (2007) (discussing double-blind identification and sequential lineup
procedures).
4. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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the defendant is entitled to a new trial, provided that he or
she can show that there is a "reasonable probability" that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different, had the
exculpatory evidence at issue not been withheld.5
Numerous commentators have questioned whether the
remedy, under current Brady jurisprudence, is sufficient to
assure that wrongful convictions are being avoided,
individual defendants are receiving a fair trial, and that the
integrity of the criminal justice system is being protected.6
Part I of this article examines whether the current remedy for
a Brady violation-the possibility of a new trial, if the Brady
prejudice standard7 is met-serves as a sufficient deterrent to
prosecutors, and concludes that it does not; Part II evaluates
various alternative remedies proposed by commentators; and
Part III suggests a new incentive mechanism.
Under the new incentive mechanism that I am proposing,
a defendant would be entitled to dismissal of the indictment
against her, without the possibility of re-indictment, rather
than a new trial, where the Brady violation is shown to be the
product of willful misconduct by the prosecutor. The intent of
the actor who commits the misconduct would be paramount
in determining whether dismissal of the indictment is
appropriate. Under this proposal, Brady's current prejudice
standard would be maintained. The interaction of these two
central precepts-evaluation of the intent of the prosecutor
and maintaining Brady's current prejudice standard-would
5. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (discussing a situation where ineffective
counsel led to a prejudicial outcome)); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
433 (1995).
6. Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP.
DEF. J. 33, 37-38 (2004); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 890-901 (1995); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 693, 696-97 (1987); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong without a Remedy: The
Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 835 (1997); see also Maurice Possley &
Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win: The
Flip Side of a Fair Trial, CRI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at N1 (reporting on a
nationwide survey finding-since 1963, 381 homicide cases that had been
reversed on appeal as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, including Brady
violations and use of false evidence).
7. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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result in dismissal of the indictment only where it is
established that the prosecutor acted intentionally and
willfully in suppressing exculpatory evidence, and the
evidence is of such a nature that its suppression truly
prejudiced the defendant. The imposition of an intent
standard, coupled with a severe sanction to the prosecution
(dismissal of the indictment and an inability to re-indict
the defendant), should lead to a reduction in the likelihood
that a prosecutor would suppress evidence.' Yet by
maintaining Brady's prejudice standard, only the truly
harmed defendant would benefit from the severe sanction
to the prosecution proposed. Further, an incentive to
disclose previously withheld evidence could be created by
exempting cases from the operation of the proposed rule
where the prosecution comes forward and discloses the
evidence.
I. THE RULE OF BRADY V. MARYLAND
Under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecution9 has an
obligation, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to provide an accused with exculpatory,
material evidence. 10 In Brady, the Court held that the
8. Risk is typically defined as a factor of probability and severity. See
RICHARD WILSON & EDMUND A.C. CROUCH, RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 9 (2d ed.
2001). The severity of the harm proposed, therefore, should result in
prosecutors taking fewer risks in the form of Brady violations. "That
prosecutors actually do assess the risks and benefits associated with
misconduct is an intuitively, anecdotally, and empirically well-founded
conclusion." Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
393, 430 (1992).
9. The Brady rule applies to evidence known to those acting on the
government's behalf, such as police officers. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547
U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006) (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).
10. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also impose such an obligation
on prosecutors. Rule 3.8, entitled Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,
provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall .. .(d) make timely disclosure
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,
and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility
by a protective order of the tribunal ....
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1983). This rule is broader than
Brady, as it does not contain a materiality standard.
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suppression by the prosecution,1' of evidence that is
material to either guilt or punishment and is favorable to the
accused 12 is a violation of that accused individual's due
process rights, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.13  Exculpatory evidence encompasses
impeachment evidence.' 4
The prosecution's Brady obligation is largely self-
enforced: prosecutors determine what is exculpatory and
what must be turned over to the defense.15 As a result, lack
of compliance with the Brady rule will often go undetected,
and it is fair to assume that most Brady violations go
undiscovered. Because the essence of a Brady violation is
that the prosecution has withheld information from both the
defense and the court, there is no court that would be aware
of such a violation. Brady violations often come to light
during trial or post-conviction, usually by way of
re-investigation or fortuity. 16  The type of full-scale
re-investigation that is typically necessary to discover
11. Evidence is not deemed suppressed if the defendant knows of it, or
should have known of it. See, e.g., Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir.
2001); Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no Brady
violation where the defense could have obtained the evidence through
"reasonable diligence"); Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907 (l1th Cir. 1995). Where
the prosecution has hidden evidence, however, the defense is not obligated to
search it out. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004).
12. Subsequent to Brady, the Court abandoned the requirement that the
defense specifically request exculpatory material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
13. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
14. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Court clarified that
the Brady doctrine applies to nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility.
The prosecution failed to disclose that a critical prosecution witness had been
told that he would not be prosecuted if he testified against the defendant. Id. at
150-51.
The Court in Giglio also explained that every attorney in a prosecutor's
office has the obligation to disclose such information to the defense, whether or
not he or she made the promise to the witness. Id. at 154. The Court explained
that "M[a] promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes,
to the Government." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272
(1958); American Bar Association, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Discovery and Procedure Before Trial § 2.1(d) (1970)).
15. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987).
16. An example of fortuity is when defense counsel discovers information
relevant to the credibility of a witness in one case because the same witness is
involved in a second case where the same attorney represents a different
defendant. If the credibility evidence were disclosed in the second case, but not
the first, the attorney would fortuitously discover a Brady violation in the first
case.
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previously suppressed exculpatory evidence post-conviction is
rarely conducted.17 This is both logical and appropriate: if the
defense could gain access to exculpatory material that is
provided it by the prosecution on its own, a due process rule
requiring the disclosure of such material would be
unnecessary. Unfortunately, as a consequence, the actual
number of Brady violations remains unknown.
Less frequently, Brady violations are discovered by a
prosecutor-either the original prosecutor or a different
prosecutor18-and brought to the attention of the court and
the defense. A prosecutor who discovers, at any point, that
her office has failed to provide the defense with Brady
evidence is required to disclose this failure.
In Brady, the Court made clear that its paramount
interest was the protection of an accused individual's right to
a fair trial.19 Notably, the Court explicitly said that it was
not including the punishment of prosecutors in its rationale.2 °
Consistent with this lack of interest in punishing prosecutors,
the Brady rule applies whether the suppression of evidence is
the result of good faith or bad faith.21
The types of evidence that are most commonly the
subject of Brady violations fall into a small number
of general categories: 22 (1) evidence that a prosecution
17. The appellate process is not well suited to the discovery of
Brady violations. Typically, appellate review is limited to legal errors
made below. Accordingly, it is rare that appellate counsel will conduct a
factual reinvestigation. Furthermore, most criminal defendants are
indigent and, therefore, do not have the resources to conduct this type of
investigation.
18. In the case of an intentional Brady violation, one would have to assume
that it would be a different prosecutor, or that the prosecutor who committed an
intentional Brady violation had a change of heart regarding his past
misconduct.
19. "The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society
for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair .... " Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. A number of courts have held that the evidence must be admissible to
fall within the Brady rule. See Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir.
1998); United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The
Supreme Court has also suggested that only admissible evidence is subject to
the Brady rule. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995). There are,
however, cases that find that inadmissible evidence is within the Brady rule
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witness received or was to receive a benefit in exchange
for her testimony,23 (2) evidence that casts doubt on
the credibility of a prosecution witness in some other
fashion,24 (3) evidence that someone other than the defendant
committed the crime at issue,2" and (4) evidence that
otherwise undermines the prosecution's case against the
defendant.26
The Supreme Court has crafted a rigorous materiality
standard for Brady violations. Where the prosecution has
suppressed exculpatory evidence, a defendant is entitled to a
new trial only if he or she can establish that "there is a
reasonable probability that, had [the suppressed evidence]
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."27  In defining its "reasonable
probability of a different result" materiality standard, the
Court has explained that it is met when the prosecution's
suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the
trial."28
where the evidence could lead to admissible evidence. See Ellsworth v. Warden,
333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir.
1999).
23. United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1997), is in
this category. The prosecution in Arnold suppressed tape recordings that
demonstrated, inter alia, that the main prosecution witness testified falsely at
trial when he said that he had no expectation that he would receive a benefit in
exchange for his cooperation. Id. at 1315-17.
24. Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1999), is an example of such a
case. In Crivens, a murder case, the prosecution withheld the criminal history
of the "key" prosecution witness. Id. at 998.
25. Robinson v. Cain, 510 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. La. 2007), falls into
this category. The state in Robinson withheld a police report containing
details corroborating the defendant's version of the events at issue,
and supplying a motive for a person other than the defendant to
have committed the murder of which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 409-
10.
26. People v. Hunter, 892 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 2008), is an example of such
a case. In Hunter, a sex crimes case, the prosecution withheld that
the complainant had, subsequent to the incident with the defendant, accused
a different individual of the same crime under similar circumstances.
Without the suppressed information, the defense was without a basis to
explore whether the defendant had been the victim of a false allegation. Id. at
366.
27. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995).
28. Id. at 434 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678
(1985)).
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II. THE ROLE OF BRADY IN THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence is a
well-documented problem29 in the criminal justice system.30
The ongoing nature of this problem strongly suggests that the
current system for sanctioning Brady violations-only
granting the defendant a new trial when suppressed Brady
evidence is discovered, and the defendant is able to meet
Brady's materiality standard-is not effective. 3' This
problem is especially troubling given that the withholding of
exculpatory evidence has been widely identified as a
significant cause of wrongful convictions,32 and the conviction
29. It is difficult to discern, based on published decisions, whether certain
prosecutors are repeat Brady violators, as these decisions often do not name the
prosecutor who committed, or was alleged to have committed, the Brady
violation. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal
Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 449 (2002). There are a limited
number of cases, however, in which the prosecutor at issue is named. See
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 13-15 n.75 (1998).
Similarly, it is difficult to establish whether Brady violations are the product of
aberrant behavior or whether certain prosecution offices implicitly or explicitly
condone them.
30. See supra note 6. When the New York State Bar Association Task Force
on Wrongful Convictions analyzed fifty-three New York State wrongful
conviction cases, it concluded that "government practices," by prosecutors
and police were a "possible cause" of wrongful conviction in more than
fifty percent of the cases. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS'N's TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 19 (2009),
http'//www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/TaskForceonWrongfulConviction
s/TFWrongfulConvictionsreport.pdf. Brady violations were one of the four types
of government practices the task force identified as possibility leading to
wrongful convictions. Id.
31. Part of the problem seems to be that, as Richard Rosen argues, "a
prosecutor knows that a decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if
discovered, will not necessarily result in a reversal of the conviction." See
Rosen, supra note 6, at 707-08.
32. The Innocence Project identifies the seven most common causes of
wrongful convictions as being: eyewitness misidentification, unreliable/limited
science, false confessions, forensic science misconduct, unreliable
informants/snitches, bad lawyering, and government misconduct. See
The Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction,
http'J/www.innocenceproject.orgfunderstand/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). In a
study analyzing the first seventy-four DNA exoneration cases, the Innocence
Project found that prosecutorial misconduct was found to have played a role in
the wrongful conviction in forty-five percent of the cases. DWYER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 365. The Innocence Project identifies suppression
of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution as a common form of prosecutorial
misconduct. See The Innocence Project, Government Misconduct,
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of an innocent person is a wrong of broad societal acceptance.
Brady violations can also undermine confidence in the
integrity of the criminal justice system. The idea of
a prosecutor-the people's representative-violating a
fundamental rule mandated by the Constitution does not
comport with society's general expectation of how the
criminal justice system should function.3
III. ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Given the general agreement among commentators that
the current remedy for Brady violations does not sufficiently
foster compliance by prosecutors with the Brady rule, there is
an active discussion in the criminal justice literature
regarding alternative enforcement mechanisms.34  These
alternatives include the following:3"
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last
visited Mar. 22, 2009). As an example of suppression of exculpatory evidence
resulting in a wrongful conviction of an innocent person, the Innocence Project
website contains a description of the prosecution and exoneration of Lesly Jean
of North Carolina. See The Innocence Project, Lesly Jean,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/183.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
Mr. Jean was convicted of rape and sexual assault and sentenced to two life
terms of imprisonment. The Innocence Project, Lesly Jean, supra note 32. His
conviction was reversed after Mr. Jean had served nine years in prison when it
was discovered that the prosecution and police suppressed exculpatory evidence.
The Innocence Project, Lesly Jean, supra note 32. Mr. Jean was subsequently
exonerated by DNA testing. The Innocence Project, Lesly Jean, supra note 32.
See also CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA'S
LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003).
33. Prosecutors have a special role and set of obligations in the criminal
justice system. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating
that the prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done"); see also Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 314-15 (2001) (the prosecutor's obligation is "not
simply to convict the guilty but to protect the innocent.").
34. See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 6, at 44 ("In fact, in many cases, the only
sanction a prosecutor receives is in the form of a critical judicial opinion
concerning prosecutorial misconduct."); Rosen, supra note 6, at 730-31
(describing the infrequency of disciplinary actions against prosecutors for
Brady-type misconduct and the leniency of the sanctions actually imposed).
35. The alternative enforcement mechanisms discussed are limited to those
addressing complete Brady violations, rather than late disclosure of Brady
material. In her student note, Elizabeth Napier Dewar proposes an alternative
remedy for the situation where previously suppressed Brady material is
discovered by the defense during trial or immediately prior to trial. Elizabeth
Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J.
1450 (2006). Dewar proposes that, in such a situation, the judge should instruct
the jury on the prosecution's obligation to disclose such evidence, and the
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1. Financial Penalties to Prosecutors, by Way of Lawsuits or
Fines36
A number of commentators have suggested that
individual prosecutors should be held personally liable for
defense should be permitted to argue that the failure to meet this obligation
establishes reasonable doubt. Id. at 1452.
36. This is a different notion than compensation for wrongful conviction.
Such compensation is authorized in a number of jurisdictions, as well as under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(6), Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Alabama, California, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin have statutes for compensating wrongfully convicted individuals.
These statutes differ in terms of the level of compensation, filing deadlines, and
exclusions. For example, Alabama requires that the claim be filed within two
years of exoneration, and allows compensation of $50,000 per year of wrongful
conviction. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159 (1975). If convicted of a new felony, the
claimant may no longer receive compensation. Id. § 29-2-161. California
requires that the claim be filed within six months of acquittal, pardon, or
release, and permits compensation of $100 per day of wrongful incarceration.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2009). The claimant must show he did
not "contribute to the bringing about of his arrest or conviction." Id. § 4903. In
the District of Columbia, there is no limit on the amount of compensation an
individual may receive. D.C. CODE § 2-421 (2002). Louisiana allows for
compensation of $15,000 per year of wrongful incarceration, up to a maximum
of $150,000, if the claimant's conviction has been vacated and she can prove
factual innocence. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8-.9 (2009); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN art. 87 (2009). The claimant is also eligible for reimbursement for
job or skill training for one year, medical and counseling services for three
years, and tuition at a community college or the state university. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8. In Massachusetts, a wrongfully convicted person who
did not plead guilty (unless the plea was withdrawn, vacated or nullified) must
file for compensation within two years of exoneration and may receive up to
$500,000, as well as college tuition. MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 258D, §§ 1-9
(West 2004). A wrongfully convicted person in New Jersey must file for
compensation within two years of release or pardon and may receive the greater
of $20,000 per year of wrongful incarceration, or double the amount of his
income in the year prior to incarceration. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1-6 (West
1997). The New York statute, which has a two-year limitations period, applies
where the wrongfully convicted individual "did not by his own conduct cause or
bring about his conviction." N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2009).
Compensation is available for the amount "the court determines will fairly and
reasonably compensate" the claimant. Id. An individual wrongfully convicted
in Tennessee must file for compensation within one year of exoneration, and is
eligible to receive $1,000,000. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (2004). The Virginia
statute entitles a wrongfully convicted individual whose conviction has been
vacated and who did not plead guilty (unless he was charged with a capital
offense) to ninety percent of the Virginia per capita personal income for up to
twenty years plus a tuition award worth $10,000 in the Virginia community
college system. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10-.11 (2007).
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Brady violations,37 with some arguing explicitly in favor of
financial incentives or disincentives.3" Supreme Court
precedent, however, presents a serious impediment to such
proposals, as it provides for absolute immunity for
prosecutors acting in their prosecutorial function.39 In Imbler
v. Pachtman,40 the Court held that prosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the
exercise of prosecutorial functions.41 In interpreting what
37. See, e.g., Weeks, supra note 6, at 914-22. Weeks advocates that "for the
most serious Brady violations, prosecutors should be held personally liable for
damages sustained by the defendant for wrongful imprisonment." Id. at 833.
38. Tracey L. Meares asserts that "[flinancial incentives could motivate
prosecutors to behave ethically." Meares, supra note 6, at 901. Professor
Meares proposes a system in which prosecutors are financially rewarded with a
bonus when appellate review of a case does not establish misconduct by a
prosecutor, or a defendant does not seek appellate review of his conviction. Id.
at 902. It is Professor Meares's contention that when "the defendant does not
appeal his conviction ... it must be assumed that the prosecutor's behavior was
proper." Id. There are, however, many reasons why, even in a situation when
the prosecutor has committed misconduct, the defendant would not seek
appellate review of his conviction. Furthermore, one could argue that it is
unseemly to reward prosecutors for fulfilling their constitutional obligations.
39. When prosecutors act outside a prosecutorial function, they are entitled
only to qualified immunity. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)
("A prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do
not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for
judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity." (citing Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-96 (1991))). In determining whether a prosecutor is
entitled to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity, the Court has directed
that a functional test should be used. Id. at 269-70; Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (stating that "the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it" is the relevant inquiry). Only conduct
"intimately associated with the judicial process," dealing with the "initiating or
conducting of a prosecution" is entitled to absolute immunity. Burns, 500 U.S.
at 494.
Recognizing the federal rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity from civil
liability, Professor Weeks suggests that prosecutors may be liable under state
law. Weeks, supra note 6, at 914-22. Weeks, however, recognizes that most
states do not have an analog to a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
at 915. He further considers whether absolute prosecutorial immunity for
malicious prosecution could be extended to Brady-based claims under a state's
constitution. Id.
40. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
41. Id. at 430. After the defendant in Imbler was convicted, the prosecutor
discovered evidence that supported the defendant's alibi and cast doubt on the
credibility of one of the witnesses who identified the defendant as the
perpetrator. Id. at 412. Less than one month before Imbler was scheduled to be
executed, the prosecutor presented this evidence in a letter to the governor. Id.
Imbler's conviction was ultimately overturned, after a federal court granted his
habeas corpus petition, finding that the prosecution used false and misleading
testimony to convict him, and the police suppressed exculpatory evidence. Id. at
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constitutes a prosecutorial function,42 the Court has taken a
broad view, defining prosecutorial acts as those that are
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process." 43 Consequently, even knowing, willful Brady
violations fall within the Imbler rule of absolute prosecutorial
immunity.'
Although the Imbler Court's historical basis for absolute
prosecutorial immunity is widely understood to be
inaccurate, 4  and its holding has been the subject of
significant criticism,46 the Court has shown no willingness to
414. After being released from prison, Imbler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against the prosecutor and the police. Id. at 415. The prosecutor was held to be
absolutely immune from liability. Id. at 430.
42. Prosecutorial acts outside the traditional prosecutorial function, such as
administrative and investigative activities, are entitled to only qualified
immunity. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
43. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
44. While Congress could amend § 1983 to eliminate this broad immunity, it
has shown no inclination to do so.
45. Concurring in Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 130 (1997), Justice
Scalia rejected the historical support for the Imbler rule. He explained that the
notion that prosecutors were protected by absolute immunity from liability
under the common law in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, is inaccurate. Id. at
132. For reasons of stare decisis, however, Justice Scalia took the position that
Imbler should not be overruled. Id. at 135. Margaret Johns contends that
absolute prosecutorial immunity was not applied by a court until 1896, well
after § 1983 was enacted. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 55.
46. In fact, Justice White's concurrence in Imbler was a criticism of the
broad scope of the rule of absolute immunity. Joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, Justice White stated:
I disagree with any implication that absolute immunity for prosecutors
extends to suits based on claims of unconstitutional suppression of
evidence because I believe such a rule would threaten to injure the
judicial process and to interfere with Congress' purpose in enacting 42
U.S.C. § 1983, without any support in statutory language or history.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 433. Justice White agreed with the majority that
prosecutors should be absolutely immune for claims "that they knew or should
have known that the testimony of a witness called by the prosecution was false."
Id. at 440. He broke with the majority, however, regarding absolute immunity
from "suits for constitutional violations other than those based on the
prosecutor's decision to initiate proceedings or his actions in bringing
information or argument to the court." Id. at 441. He stated that "[miost
particularly I disagree with any implication that the absolute immunity extends
to suits charging unconstitutional suppression of evidence." Id. (citing Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Regarding the impact of such liability, Justice
White explained, "one would expect that the judicial process would be
protected-and indeed its integrity enhanced-by denial of immunity to
prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 442. He continued:
It would stand this immunity rule on its head, however, to apply it to a
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depart from the rule, even for knowing or willful Brady
violations.47 To the contrary, the Court has consistently
reaffirmed its commitment to the broad rule that prosecutors
should not be subject to civil liability when they suppress
exculpatory evidence-even if the suppression is
unquestionably willful.4" The Court's guiding principle has
been a concern about hampering the independence of
prosecutors and shifting resources from prosecutorial work to
defending against civil suits.4 9 The repeated reaffirmance of
the Imbler rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity is a
seemingly insurmountable obstacle to sanctioning prosecutors
suit based on a claim that the prosecutor unconstitutionally withheld
information from the court. Immunity from a suit based upon a claim
that the prosecutor suppressed or withheld evidence would discourage
precisely the disclosure of evidence sought to be encouraged by the rule
granting prosecutors immunity from defamation suits. Denial of
immunity for unconstitutional withholding of evidence would
encourage such disclosure. A prosecutor seeking to protect himself
from liability for failure to disclose evidence may be induced to disclose
more than is required. But, this will hardly injure the judicial process.
Indeed, it will help it.
Id. at 442-43.
Professor Johns sharply criticizes the rule of absolute prosecutorial
immunity and the rationales presented by the Imbler Court in support of the
rule. With respect to the concern about vexatious litigation, Johns argues that
absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect the honest prosecutor, as that
prosecutor is protected by qualified immunity. Johns, supra note 45, at 55. It is
Johns's contention that absolute immunity only protects "the most incompetent
and willful wrongdoers," at the expense of innocent victims. Id. at 55-56.
Johns contends that "[pirosecutorial liability-with the safeguard of qualified
immunity to prevent vexatious litigation-is necessary to ensure the integrity of
the criminal justice system." Id.
47. The most recent example of the Court's commitment to the Imbler rule
of absolute immunity is its decision in Van de Kamp, in which it held that
prosecutors are absolutely immune for lapses in supervision, training, and
information system management that result in Brady violations. Van de Kamp,
129 S. Ct. at 856.
48. It is notable that lower courts have, on occasion, expressed frustration
with this rule in the context of particularly egregious prosecutorial misconduct.
See, e.g., Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005)
("Although such conduct [knowing use of perjured testimony and deliberate
withholding of exculpatory information] would be 'reprehensible,' it does not
make the prosecutor amenable to a civil suit for damages."); Cousin v. Small,
325 F,3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, what
would be, in essence, an "egregiousness" exception to the Imbler rule).
49. In Imbler, the Court warned against "harassment by unfounded
litigation [that] would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his
public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of
exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust." Imbler,
424 U.S. at 423.
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for Brady violations with financial penalties.50
An additional problem with a rule of imposing civil
liability for prosecutors who have committed Brady violations
is that it creates a disincentive to disclose, post-conviction,
that exculpatory evidence was wrongly suppressed. 1 Given
the widely held belief that Brady violations undermine the
integrity of the criminal justice system and create a risk of
wrongful conviction, there should be a strong incentive for
prosecutors to admit to their own mistaken suppression of
evidence, or to disclose similar violations by fellow
prosecutors. If such an admission or disclosure could result
in financial liability, the great risk that such information,
when discovered, would not be disclosed could increase.
2. Expansion of Open File Discovery to All Jurisdictions
Under open file discovery, which has been adopted in a
limited number of jurisdictions,52  the full police and
prosecution files are made available to the defense. As a
general proposition, the defense bar supports open file
discovery, as it results in more information being provided to
the defense, typically earlier in the proceedings.53 In the
specific context of Brady reform,54 it also provides the benefit
50. Looking at the possibility of financial incentives and/or disincentives
from an opposite viewpoint, Professor Meares argues that prosecutors should be
given positive financial incentives for complying with their constitutional
obligations, including those established by Brady. Meares, supra note 6, at 910.
51. There are a number of reported cases in which the suppression of
exculpatory information came to light because of the post-conviction disclosure
of a prosecutor (typically a different prosecutor than the one who initially
suppressed the information). In fact, Imbler is such a case.
52. Minnesota and North Carolina practice open file discovery. Additional
states, Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire and Oregon,
require open file discovery in capital cases.
53. More liberal discovery rules are generally believed to result in fewer
Brady violations for at least two main reasons. First, the more information that
is provided to the defense, the more likely that Brady material will be provided.
Second, even if the material provided is not itself Brady material, fuller
disclosure makes it more likely that defense counsel will learn facts that lead to
the discovery of Brady material.
54. Professor Rosen recommends, in essence, open file discovery. See Rosen,
supra note 3, at 272. He suggests:
[Disclosure equivalent to that in civil cases should be required in
criminal cases. The change needed is really rather simple-the
presumption should change to favor disclosure rather than secrecy.
The entire police file should be provided to the defense, with reverse
discovery as allowed under constitutional strictures. To avoid harm to
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of allowing the defense, rather than the prosecution, to decide
which evidence is material.
Open file discovery will not always function as a
substitute for a prosecutor's compliance with her Brady
obligation, because there can be exculpatory materials not
contained in the file, and thus not provided to the defense as
part of open file discovery. If, for example, in the context of
exculpatory evidence that has not been reduced to writing, a
witness provided information, via an oral account, that cast
doubt on the defendant's guilt, the witness's statement would
be Brady material. But if this statement was not reduced to a
writing, open file discovery would play no role in assuring
that the statement was provided to the defense. Open file
discovery also provides no assistance where there is a
knowing, willful Brady violation. It seems apparent that a
prosecutor who makes a conscious decision to withhold
exculpatory material from the defense is equally likely to
remove such information from the file before "complying"
with open file discovery. Adoption of open file discovery in all
jurisdictions, therefore, would not eliminate Brady violations,
but it would help address the problem.
3. Disciplinary Sanctions
The disciplining of lawyers who commit misconduct, by
state and county disciplinary committees, provides an
appropriate vehicle for punishing prosecutors who violate
Brady. Because these committees limit their inquiry to the
conduct of the attorney under review, the materiality of
evidence suppressed is irrelevant. While this makes for an
inquiry that is narrowly focused, disciplinary committees
infrequently sanction prosecutors who violate Brady.
In 1987, Richard Rosen published an exhaustive study
of the frequency of disciplinary sanctions in response to
known Brady violations. 55 Rosen sent a survey regarding
disciplinary sanctions to each state's disciplinary
committee,5 6  and received responses from forty-one
witnesses or ongoing investigations, and to satisfy any further
legitimate governmental interest, appropriate provisions for protective
orders should be implemented.
Id.
55. Rosen, supra note 6, at 707-08.
56. Id. at 730-31.
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committees. The committees reported the following
sanctions: thirty-five states disclosed no formal complaints
filed for Brady-type misconduct; one state disclosed three
formal complaints that were dismissed after a hearing; and
the remaining five states issued four minor sanctions.58 In
terms of more serious sanctions in these final five states,
Rosen found one suspension and one expulsion; the expulsion,
however, was subsequently reversed. 9
Joseph Weeks, concentrating on the ten-year period
following Rosen's study, updated Rosen's research and
discovered a similar pattern of negligible discipline. Weeks
found just seven cases where a prosecutor was referred to a
disciplinary body due to a Brady violation.6" Four of the
seven referrals resulted in discipline: a private reprimand, a
public reprimand, a suspension of three months, and a
suspension of six months.6' As this research demonstrates,
disciplinary committee action in response to Brady violations
is uncommon and, when it occurs, mild.62
The general lack of disciplinary committee response to
Brady violations is not surprising.63 Disciplinary committees
are typically understaffed, which makes it unlikely that they
will seek out cases when they often have difficulty dealing
with their caseload of referred matters.64 Most disciplinary
actions result from financial matters, and are referred by the
person who believes he or she was wronged.65 In the context
of Brady violations, the person wronged is a criminal
defendant who typically will seek to be vindicated by the
courts.
57. Id. at 730.
58. Id. at 731.
59. Weeks, supra note 6, at 881.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 882.
62. See In re Attorney C., 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002) (recognizing that
prosecutors rarely face discipline for discovery violations, including Brady
violations).
63. This is not to suggest that disciplinary committees do not, on occasion,
investigate reported Brady violation cases.
64. Professor Rosen suggests that "the bar counsel's offices should review
the reported decisions and institute disciplinary proceedings whenever an
opinion indicates possible prosecutorial suppression or falsifications of evidence,
irrespective of due process violations." Rosen, supra note 6, at 735-36.
65. See Philip F. Downey, Attorneys' Trust Accounts: The Bar's Role in the
Preservation of Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, 276 (1988).
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Disciplinary sanctions do not work to prevent Brady
violations. Discipline is too rare and too mild to have any
deterrent effect. 66 Without a substantial shift in the
punishment imposed by disciplinary committees when a
prosecutor withholds exculpatory evidence,67 it is difficult to
imagine that prosecutorial behavior is much affected by the
threat of disciplinary sanctions.68
4. Criminal Prosecution
While state penal laws contemplate the prosecution of
prosecutors who violate Brady,69 they are so infrequently
enforced that the possibility of prosecution barely warrants a
mention. One anomalous case is that of the prosecutor who,
in 2006, handled the prosecution of members of the Duke
University lacrosse team on rape and kidnap charges.70 The
prosecutor committed various types of misconduct, including
66. Read v. Virginia State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 544 (Va. 1987), is an example of
the general lack of willingness to discipline prosecutors. In Read, the
prosecutor withheld the fact that a witness who had previously identified the
defendant as the perpetrator recanted the identification. Id. at 545-46. The
court found no Brady violation as defense counsel learned the information from
the witness himself, who, concerned that the exculpatory information would not
otherwise be provided to the defense, contacted defense counsel. Id. at 545.
While the state bar disciplinary committee had revoked the prosecutor's license
to practice law, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the order of the
disciplinary committee. Id. at 544.
67. There are, however, calls for greater use of disciplinary sanctions of
prosecutors who violate Brady. For example, the subcommittee on Government
Practices of the New York State Bar Association's Task Force on Wrongful
Convictions recommended the creation of a statewide procedure for identifying
and reviewing Brady violations. See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS'N'S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 30, at 9.
68. An additional, related enforcement mechanism is internal discipline by
the district attorney's office. Whether such mechanisms exist in prosecution
offices does not appear to be addressed in the literature.
69. Such conduct could constitute, inter alia, criminal contempt.
70. The case involved allegations that, in March 2006, three members of the
Duke University lacrosse team committed sex crimes against a woman at the
house of members of the team. Duff Wilson & Jonathan D. Glater, Files from
Duke Rape Case Give Details but No Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at Al,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E2DF103EF
936A1575BCOA9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=l. Ultimately, the
charges against the three men were dropped. Duff Wilson & David Barstow,
Duke Prosecutor Throws Out Case Against Players, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2007, at Al, available at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/us/
12duke.html?_r=l&scp=l&sq=all%20charges%2dropped%20in%20duke%20ca
se&st=cse.
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withholding exculpatory DNA test results.7' Subsequent to
being disbarred,7 2 the prosecutor was found guilty of criminal
contempt and sentenced to a jail term of twenty-four hours.7 3
This case was highly unusual, and was surely influenced
by the national publicity it attracted, as well as the resources
of the defendants who were the victims of the prosecutorial
misconduct at issue.7 4 In more typical cases, the prosecution
of attorneys who violate Brady is nonexistent, thus rendering
the deterrent value of the threat of prosecution to nearly
nothing.
5. Abolition of the Public Prosecutor
Another interesting idea suggested, but ultimately
rejected, by Janet Hoeffel is abolition of the public
prosecutor's office altogether, and the adoption of the British
system,76  where private attorneys are called upon to
represent the government in criminal prosecutions.77 The
71. See Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor Disbarred, CNN.COM, June 17, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/16/duke.lacrosse/index.html?iref=newssearch.
72. Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, Former Duke Prosecutor Nifong
Disbarred, ABCNEWS.COM, June 16, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
story?id=3285862&page=1.
73. Shalia Dewan, Duke Prosecutor Jailed; Students Seek Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at A8, available at http'//www.nytimes.com/2007/
09/08/us/08duke.html.
74. Another anomalous situation is that of the prosecution of former United
States Senator Ted Stevens. At the time of the writing of this article, Senator
Stevens's ethics conviction had been dismissed-on the government's own
motion-due to prosecutorial misconduct, and the judge who presided over the
case had named a special prosecutor to investigate whether the six Justice
Department prosecutors at issue should themselves be prosecuted. Neil
A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/politics/
08stevens.html; Michel Martin & Nina Totenberg, Stevens Case a Blow
to Justice Department, NAT'L PUB. RADIo, Apr. 6, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 102778052. While it was
the government that sought dismissal of the indictment, it is notable that there
had been a change in administration between when the misconduct was
committed and when it was discovered.
75. One additional criminal prosecution of a prosecutor who violated Brady
was located. See Brophy v. Comm. on Profl Standards, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818 (App.
Div. 1981). An attorney who violated Brady was convicted in federal court of
the misdemeanor of deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 242, and sentenced to pay a fine of $500. Id. at 819. A subsequent
disciplinary proceeding resulted in censure. Id.
76. The British prosecutorial agency is the Crown Prosecution Service. For
more information, see The Crown Prosecution Service, http://www.cps.gov.uk.
77. Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good
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theory behind this proposal is that those who act only part
time in a prosecutorial role will be less likely to suppress
exculpatory evidence in an attempt to secure a conviction-
because as private citizens they will be less concerned about
"winning" a conviction and more concerned about justice
being done and the rules being followed.7" Putting aside
whether the theory behind this argument is correct, it seems
virtually impossible that such a substantial change in the
general United States system of prosecution would ever be
adopted. 9
IV. PROPOSAL: ESTABLISH A BAR TO RETRIAL WHERE A
WILLFUL BRADY VIOLATION IS DEMONSTRATED
There are two central priorities that should be considered
when evaluating remedies for Brady violations: the adequate
protection of the accused, and the deterrence of prosecutorial
misconduct. The Brady rule was designed to address the first
priority ° by permitting a defendant a new trial when it has
been shown that exculpatory evidence was withheld from the
defense, and there is a "reasonable probability" that the
suppressed evidence could have affected the outcome of
the proceeding. 81 While some commentators have argued
otherwise, 2 modification of this aspect of the rule is
unnecessary.
The current remedial mechanism, however, is much less
effective in meeting the second value. The possibility of a
retrial if a Brady violation is discovered does not provide a
sufficient incentive to prosecutors to abide by their Brady
obligations. Particularly with a self-enforced rule like Brady,
it is important that the penalty for violating the rule is
Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1153-54 (2005).
78. Id.
79. In some small jurisdictions, however, prosecutions are handled by part-
time prosecutors. Also, similar to the British model, special prosecutors are on
occasion appointed to handle certain prosecutions and/or investigations.
Whether these part-time and special prosecutors are more or less likely to
commit Brady violations does not appear to have been studied, but is an
interesting question.
80. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
81. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995).
82. Rosen argues, in essence, that the materiality standard should be
abandoned in cases where the Brady violation is shown to be willful. Rosen,
supra note 6.
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especially onerous.' Dismissal of the indictment in a case
where the prosecution intentionally and willfully withholds
exculpatory evidence meeting the Brady materiality standard
is one such penalty.
The adoption of this proposal would further a number of
important interests. First, it would create a substantial
disincentive to prosecutors in committing Brady violations.
Putting aside cases of unintentional Brady violations, which
are not implicated by this proposal,' one can presume that
most often Brady violations occur either where (1) the
prosecutor has an extremely high degree of confidence in the
defendant's guilt, but some reason to doubt that the fact
finder will convict the defendant;85  or (2) where the
prosecutor believes that the exculpatory evidence at issue is
unreliable, but that it would be useful to the defense in
defending against the case." In either of these situations, if
the prosecutor willfully suppressed the evidence and this
suppression was discovered, dismissing the indictment-
allowing the defendant to go free-would be an unbearable
outcome for the prosecutor. As a result, the risk of this
outcome should be too great to allow the prosecutor to
suppress evidence. 7
83. Both the severity of the harm and the frequency with which it occurs
impact the harm's deterrent effect. See WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 8.
84. With an unintentional Brady violation, the willfulness aspect of the
proposed rule would not be met and, as a result, the current remedy of a new
trial would remain.
85. An example of such a case could be one where there are witnesses, to be
called by the prosecution, who connect the defendant to the crime, but also
witnesses, to be called by the defense, who support the defendant's alibi. If the
prosecutor believed that the prosecution witnesses were being truthful, and the
defense witnesses were being untruthful, the prosecutor would have a strong
degree of confidence in the defendant's guilt, but also good reason to believe that
the jury would accept the testimony of the defense witnesses and vote to acquit.
If there were a piece of exculpatory evidence unknown to the defense, the
concern might be that this evidence would "tip the balance" in favor of the
defense.
86. Such an example could be evidence that undermines the credibility of a
prosecution witness. Assume a case in which the verdict turns on the testimony
of a single witness, and the prosecutor has complete confidence in the testimony
of this witness connecting the defendant to the crime. If there is evidence-
such as a prior conviction under a different name-that undermines the
witness's credibility, might the prosecutor be concerned about disclosing this
exculpatory evidence?
87. Bennett L. Gershman asserts that prosecutors conduct a risk-benefit
analysis when engaging in misconduct. Gershman, supra note 8. Gershman
further argues that, under current rules, prosecutors have an incentive to risk
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While the current remedy of a new trial for the defendant
may be an annoyance to the prosecutor, his and the
government's interests are not truly harmed by having to
prosecute the defendant a second time.88 While there are
additional costs and effort that come with prosecuting a case
at a second trial, the prosecutor is in no worse a position, in
regard to securing a conviction, than if he had never
committed the Brady violation. Furthermore, as the
defendant would likely have spent some number of years in
prison prior to the discovery and litigation of the Brady
violation, there is a high likelihood that the defendant would
agree to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence less than that
imposed after the original trial. In such a circumstance, the
prosecutor would achieve a secure conviction and sentence of
someone he truly believed to be guilty. Given this reality, one
can see how certain prosecutors would take their chances by
violating Brady.9
Second, as the rule proposed in this article would only be
invoked where a willful Brady violation is discovered, it
would encourage prosecutors to come forward if they discover
a Brady violation was committed through oversight. 9' In fact,
committing misconduct. If they do so in a strong case, the conviction will likely
be upheld even with the discovery of the misconduct, due to harmless error
analysis. Id. at 430-31. In a weak case, where the prosecutor likely would not
have been able to obtain a conviction without the misconduct, even if the
misconduct is discovered and the conviction is reversed, the prosecutor is in no
worse a position than if he had not committed the misconduct. Id.
88. This constitutes a "rematch," as David L. Botsford and Stanley G.
Schneider term it in their article. See David L. Botsford & Stanley G.
Schneider, The "Law Game": Why Prosecutors Should Be Prevented from a
Rematch; Double Jeopardy Concerns Stemming from Prosecutorial Misconduct,
47 S. TEX. L. REV 729 (2006). Botsford and Schneider argue that retrial of a
defendant should be barred under the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause
after a Brady violation is discovered. Id. at 730. A similar argument is made by
Adam M. Harris, in his student note. See Adam M. Harris, Note, Two
Constitutional Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial
Misconduct Under the Brady Doctrine, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 931 (2006).
89. This is not to suggest that most prosecutors reject their constitutional
and ethical obligations under Brady. Yet, from a purely rational viewpoint, one
can understand how a less than ethical prosecutor could decide to suppress
evidence.
90. In United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2004), where the
Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the argument that a Brady violation may
act as a double jeopardy bar to a second trial, there were two alleged Brady
violations. The second violation was disclosed voluntarily by the prosecution.
Id. at 1104. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), is another case in which
the suppression of exculpatory evidence was revealed by the prosecution.
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to encourage prosecutors to come forward when a Brady
violation is discovered, all cases in which the prosecutor
discloses a Brady violation could be deemed to fall outside of
the proposed rule. Treating all prosecutors within an office as
a single entity, this exception to the proposed rule would
apply where the prosecutor who discloses the Brady violation
is not the same prosecutor who committed the violation.
Even if the prosecutor who committed the violation acted
intentionally and willfully, the voluntary disclosure of the
violation by a second prosecutor would trigger the standard
remedy of a new trial, rather than dismissal of the indictment
with a bar to retrial. The rationale behind this aspect of the
proposed rule is to encourage disclosure of Brady material,
even post-conviction.
Third, given the implications of allowing a defendant to
go free due to improper conduct by prosecutors, there would
likely be an increased vigilance in prosecution offices about
not committing Brady violations. One can presume that the
district attorney of a jurisdiction, especially where that
official is elected by popular vote, would not sit idly by if
indictments were being dismissed because of unethical
conduct by prosecutors in her office. As a result, the
deterrent effect of the proposed rule on individual prosecutors
would be amplified by stricter oversight by prosecutors acting
in a management role.
Fourth, if Brady's strict materiality standards are
maintained, there should be no risk that the guilty defendant
who is the victim of the suppression of inconsequential
evidence would receive the windfall of dismissal of the
indictment. Because a Brady violation requires a showing
that, absent the suppression of evidence, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different, 91 the suppression of inconsequential evidence does
not even trigger the Brady rule, much less the remedy
proposed in this article. That is not to say that the proposed
rule would only be applicable where the defendant is
demonstrably innocent of the crime of which she was
convicted. Assuming there is a societal cost to allowing a
possibly guilty person to go free as a punishment for serious
misconduct by a prosecutor, this proposal does not eliminate
91. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995).
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this cost. 92
1. Lessons from the Exclusionary Rule
Exclusionary rule93 jurisprudence provides a useful
analytical framework for the development and
implementation of the proposed rule. The exclusionary rule
was designed to deter police officers from violating certain
constitutional rights of defendants. The deterrent effect is
achieved by penalizing police officers when they violate the
constitutional rights at issue by suppressing otherwise
admissible evidence. 94 The proposal presented here acts in a
similar fashion by penalizing the prosecution when it
intentionally violates the Brady rule.
In general terms, the exclusionary rule renders
inadmissible at trial in the prosecution's case in chief 5
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 96
The Supreme Court has stated that the "prime purpose" of
the rule, if not the sole one, "is to deter future unlawful police
conduct."97 As the Court has explained, this purpose is meant
"to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it."98
Consistent with the notion that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to encourage police officers to abide by
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
92. This limitation is discussed further below. See infra Part IV.2.
93. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp holds that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655. The Mapp holding
extended to the States the longtime rule of the federal courts. See Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
94. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995).
95. Such evidence is admissible to impeach the defendant. See Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
96. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
97. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
98. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
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searches and seizures, 99 the Court has established "good
faith" exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 00 In United States
v. Leon, the Court held that where a police officer violates the
Fourth Amendment, but acts in good faith reliance' 01 on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate,
the exclusionary rule does not apply.102 Similarly, when a
police officer acts in good faith reliance on a substantive
criminal law statute that subsequently is declared
unconstitutional, the illegally obtained evidence is not
rendered inadmissible by the exclusionary rule. 103
Notable to the Leon decision is the extent to which the
Court explicitly considered the deterrent impact of the
exclusionary rule, and weighed it against what it termed a
"competing" interest in making sure guilty people are not set
free simply because of errors by the police. 104 The Court
explained that "[plarticularly when law enforcement officers
have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have
been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such
99. In Stone v. Powell, which held that state Fourth Amendment violations
are not cognizable on federal habeas review, the Court discussed at length the
two rationales previously recognized for the exclusionary rule: judicial integrity
and deterrence of police conduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976). Recognizing the various exceptions and
limitations to the exclusionary rule, the Court concluded that the "primary
justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct
that violates Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 486. Among the exceptions and
limitations discussed were (1) the requirement that a defendant lodge an
objection to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence, see Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); (2) standing limitations of who may challenge
the admission of illegally obtained evidence, see Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); (3) the use of illegally obtained evidence in grand jury
proceedings, see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); and (4) the use
of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment of the defendant, see Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
100. Notably, the trend under the exclusionary rule has been to evaluate the
remedial objectives of the rule before applying it to a given Fourth Amendment
violation. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Janis, "[i]f... the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use
in the instant situation is unwarranted." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
454 (1976).
101. In articulating this "good faith" standard, the Court stated that
"dishonest or reckless" activity by the police in preparing the affidavit in
support of the search warrant at issue, would fall outside the definition of "good
faith." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
102. Id. at 920-21.
103. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
104. Leon, 468 U.S at 900.
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guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal
justice system." 15 In keeping the exclusionary rule narrow in
its application, the Court has applied it only to "those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served."1" 6 In fashioning the "good faith" exception, the
Supreme Court has explained that evidence should be
suppressed only where the Fourth Amendment violation is
"substantial and deliberate." 107
The Court stated in its most recent discussion of the
exclusionary rule that the issue of whether a Fourth
Amendment violation should result in suppression of evidence
"turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of
exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct." 10 8 This standard
is also appropriately applied in the context of Brady
violations. As has been the case with the exclusionary rule
and police behavior, it would likely have an appropriate
deterrent impact on prosecutors.
2. The Proposed Rule: Implementation and Limitations
Central to the application of the proposed rule is a
determination that the prosecutor acted willfully in
suppressing exculpatory evidence that meets the Brady
materiality standard. Most often, therefore, an evidentiary
hearing would be necessary to establish whether the
prosecutor's conduct was, in fact, willful. 09 One of the facts
that should be considered at such a hearing is whether the
prosecutor in question has repeatedly been found to violate
Brady.
There should be a high bar to meeting the willfulness
standard. If dismissal of the indictment were the
consequence in a great number of Brady violation cases, there
could be an unintended disincentive for courts to find any
105. Id. at 907-08.
106. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976). In Stone v. Powell, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to state convictions on
federal habeas review where the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the claim in state court. Id. at 494.
107. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
108. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
109. One could imagine, however, that on occasion, the prosecution would
concede willfulness, especially under circumstances where the discovery of the
Brady violation also demonstrates willful conduct by the prosecutor and the
prosecutor has no legitimate defense.
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Brady violations, for fear that guilty individuals would
improperly go free. In addition, if a prosecutor commits a
Brady violation unintentionally, the deterrent effect of
dismissing the indictment would not exist. Put simply, one
cannot be deterred if one acts without intent. 110
A high bar to establishing willfulness is also appropriate
given the severity of the sanction to the prosecution, and
society, where the defendant may have committed the crime.
This is especially important given that there is an
alternative, less severe remedy already in place: a new trial
for the defendant. In setting a new trial as the norm in terms
of remedy, the Supreme Court explained that it was doing so
because of the harm to a defendant when the prosecution
suppresses material evidence."' It is for this reason that the
Brady rule applies to both intentional and unintentional
suppression of evidence-as a defendant is equally harmed no
matter what the cause of the suppression. Yet, as the
intended function of the proposed rule is to deter future
misconduct by prosecutors, it should be applied only in
situations where the deterrent value is high.
One likely objection to the proposed rule is the possibility
that some guilty defendants would receive the "windfall" of
dismissal of the indictment because of the prosecutor's bad
intent in suppressing material evidence. This possibility
seems somehow random and unfair as the defendant who is
the victim of an intentional Brady violation is subjected to no
greater harm than the defendant who is the victim of an
unintentional Brady violation, in terms of one's ability to
defend against the charges at issue.
A similar concern exists with the exclusionary rule"1 2 but,
because of its deterrent impact, the exclusionary rule has
been maintained. In both scenarios, the deterrent effect will
only be operative if the prosecution, in the case of Brady
violations, and the police, in the case of the exclusionary rule,
are actually harmed in some cases. And such harm simply
110. There is a contrary position, however, that the deterrent effect of
dismissing the indictment would encourage prosecutors to be more careful in
general about their Brady obligations.
111. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
112. For discussion of this concern regarding the exclusionary rule, see
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 257 (1983).
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does not exist in cases in which the defendant did not commit
the crime. The prosecutor, and the police, do not benefit from
the prosecution, or arrest, of an innocent individual.
Given already-existing restrictions contained in the
Brady rule, there is a minimally legitimate concern that an
"undeserving" defendant will reap the benefit of the proposed
rule. Most significantly, there is Brady's materiality
standard--only where there is a "reasonable probability" that
the suppressed evidence would have affected the outcome of
the proceeding is the evidence within the Brady rule. 113 As a
result, suppression of trivial or inconsequential evidence does
not trigger the Brady rule at all.
Furthermore, dismissal of the indictment where the
prosecution has willfully suppressed material evidence
presents less of a societal harm, in terms of the possibility of
freeing a guilty person, than the typical operation of the
exclusionary rule. With the exclusionary rule, the evidence at
issue is always that which is beneficial to the prosecution, i.e.
suggestive of guilt. By contrast, Brady evidence must be
beneficial to the defense. Thus, there is often a link between
suppression of Brady evidence and the conviction of an
innocent person,114 while the opposite is true of the
exclusionary rule.
Though there are certainly cases where suppressed
evidence is material under the Brady standard, but there are
other strong indicators of guilt. For example, in a case with
strong forensic evidence, but only one eyewitness, the
suppression of evidence that seriously undermines the
eyewitness's credibility would likely be deemed a Brady
violation. Under the proposal presented here, if the
suppression were willful, the indictment would be dismissed
113. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667 (1985).
114. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
109-10 (2008) (discussing Brady and other "innocence-related" claims); Bennett
L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Marylan& Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007) ("Not surprisingly, violations of Brady are the
most recurring and pervasive of all constitutional procedural violations, with
disastrous consequences: innocent people are wrongfully convicted, imprisoned,
and even executed."); Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double
Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
547, 591 (2002) ("Brady and its progeny are premised on the principle that
suppression of material evidence poses a significant risk of punishing the
innocent....").
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and the defendant would go free, notwithstanding the strong
forensic evidence.
Further, a rule with such significant repercussions is also
arguably more necessary in the context of a self-policing rule,
such as Brady, than where there is some other body or party
that can oversee compliance with the rule, such as is the case
with the exclusionary rule. When a defendant is illegally
searched, the defendant is aware of the facts necessary to
establish this as a matter of law and can take appropriate
action. But, when a prosecutor suppresses exculpatory,
material evidence, the defendant is unaware.115
Given that the proposed rule borrows much of the
analytical framework of the exclusionary rule, an additional
limitation to its adoption stems from the controversial nature
of the exclusionary rule.116 The debate about the exclusionary
rule, including its purported deterrent effect, began prior to
the rule's adoption and continues to this day.1 1 7 Given the
controversy, one would expect hesitancy about applying a
similar rule in another context.
That said, many of the concerns about the exclusionary
rule are not present when applied to intentional Brady
violations. First, as is discussed above, the rule has more of
an inverse relationship to the truth-seeking function of a
criminal trial than does the exclusionary rule. Second, the
rule would only apply in cases of intentional, willful violations
by the prosecution.18 Third, many commentators have
115. If the defendant is otherwise aware of suppressed, material evidence, it
falls outside the Brady rule. See supra note 11.
116. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1994); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 10-11 (2001) (discussing criticism of the
exclusionary rule on the bases that it, inter alia, undermines the search for
truth by excluding relevant evidence; encourages police perjury as a way of
circumventing the rule; does nothing to protect the innocent victim of police
misconduct; does not sufficiently deter police misconduct; and, on the other
hand, "over-deters"); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1016, 1016 (1987) ("The exclusionary rule is one of the most controversial and
divisive issues in American constitutional law.").
117. See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (2008).
118. While the exclusionary rule does not apply to certain cases of "good
faith," see supra Part IV.A, there is no blanket "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule. Thus, its reach is broader than that of the proposed rule,
which requires a showing of bad faith.
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suggested that the exclusionary rule has resulted in police
officers committing perjury in order to avoid the suppression
of inculpatory evidence." 9 This perjury typically takes the
form of police officers lying about where evidence was located
before being seized, 120 or what the defendant was doing prior
to being searched. 12 1 In contrast, with the proposed Brady
rule, the fact of the suppression of material evidence would
not be in dispute for purposes of the rule's application; this
determination would be made according to traditional Brady
analysis. The single issue to be determined at an evidentiary
hearing would be the intent of the prosecutor in suppressing
evidence. Thus, the potential for perjury would be far more
limited than in the application of the exclusionary rule.
Further, the exemption of prosecutors from the rule's
application where they disclose the Brady violation
122
provides an opposite incentive mechanism to that of the
exclusionary rule.
Another potential criticism of the proposed rule arises
where a willful Brady violation is the behavior of a "rogue"
prosecutor, acting in contravention of the clear policies of the
office in which she is employed. The prosecutor's office
specifically, as well as society at large, is harmed if this rogue
prosecutor's Brady violation is subsequently discovered by the
defense and, after a judicial finding of willfulness, the
indictment is dismissed. Imagine if this rogue prosecutor
commits the willful Brady violation during her first trial, and
it is never discovered. During her second trial, she is poised
to commit another Brady violation, but discloses this fact to a
colleague, and is fired by the district attorney. In this
situation, the district attorney has done the right thing, but is
still harmed when the indictment in the first case is
dismissed.'23 This seemingly unfair scenario, however, is an
119. See Dripps, supra note 116.
120. A police officer might, for example, testify that evidence was in "plain
view," see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), when it was in fact
hidden on the person of the defendant.
121. A police officer might, for example, testify that the defendant appeared
to be armed with a weapon, and was thus subject to a safety frisk, see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), when the officer knew the defendant did not actually
possess a weapon.
122. See supra Part IV.
123. Although, in such a situation, the district attorney's office is on notice
that the "rogue" prosecutor was inclined to suppress material evidence, and
could review the file from the first trial to determine whether a Brady violation
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unavoidable, but rare, consequence of the deterrent value of
the proposed rule. One would hope that the threat of
dismissal of the indictment where there has been a willful
Brady violation would foster greater oversight of "rogue"
prosecutors. 12
4
V. CONCLUSION
Brady violations are harmful to the United States system
of justice both because they can cause wrongful convictions,
and because they undermine fundamental notions of fairness.
The current system, which is essentially self-policing, is not
sufficiently effective in forcing prosecutors to adhere to their
constitutional obligation to provide the defense with all
exculpatory evidence. The criminal justice system, and
society in general, benefit from innovations that reduce the
risk of wrongful convictions and increase public confidence in
the system. The proposal presented here is just one of many
such innovations-those already presented in the literature
and those to come.
was committed. If this was done and the Brady violation from the first trial
was discovered, under this proposal, if the district attorney's office disclosed the
Brady violation to the court, the traditional Brady remedy of a new trial would
apply, rather than the extreme sanction of dismissal of the indictment.
124. This issue relates to an additional criticism of the exclusionary rule,
that it discourages police officers from taking risks when conducting
investigations. While under the proposed rule, prosecutors might become more
cautious in abiding by their Brady violations, there would be no harm to this
side effect, as there is when the police become more cautious in investigating
crime.

